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Wen facing the COVID-19 pandemic, what was key to governments’ response velocity 
throughout Latin America? The region had more information on what to do to prevent the 
disease from spreading itself and social isolation was the most recommended measure 
to avoid contamination. Still, Latin American countries varied greatly on how fast they 
adopted strict social isolation measures. We deploy an explanatory work on which institu-
tional designs collaborates with higher delay in governments’ adoption of these measures. 
Among the institutional variables considered, we find that our variable of interest (delay) 
correlates strongly and positively with democracy, negatively with concentration of power, 
and positively with GDP per capita. These might suggest that autocrats faced less institu-
tional and moral constraints to act, while democratic leaders dealing with pluralism and 
accountability faced higher costs to implement such measures. Due to the small sample, we 
next investigate some countries’ experience looking for examples for the found correlations.
Keywords: Government’s delay; COVID-19; Political Institutions
Resumo
No enfrentamendo da pandemia do COVID-19, o que foi determinante para a velocidade 
das respostas governamentais? A região tinha mais informação sobre como impedir que 
o virus se espalhasse e o isolamento social era a medida mais recomendada para evitar 
a  contaminação. Ainda assim, os países latino-americanos variaram consideravelmente 
no quão rápido eles adotaram medidas rígidas de isolamento social. Realizamos um 
trabalho exploratório sobre que desenhos institucionais colaboraram com maior demora 
na adoção de tais medidas. Entre as variáveis institucionais consideradas, encontramos 
que nossa variável de interesse (demora) está correlacionada forte e positivamente com 
a democracia, negativamente com a concentração de poder, e positivamente com o PIB 
per capita. Isso pode sugerir que autocratas enfrentaram menos constrangimentos ins-
titucionais e morais para agir, enquanto líderes democráticos lidando com pluralismo e 
prestação de contas enfrentaram maiores custos para adotar essas medidas. Devido à 
pequena amostra, investigamos na sequência as experiências de alguns países buscando 
exemplos das correlações encontradas.
Palavras-chave: Atraso do governo; COVID-19; Instituições políticas
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Introduction
Latin America had a rare comparative advantage in 
learning how other regions dealt with the novel coronavirus 
before the pandemic hit the continent hard. But we should ask 
ourselves if Latin American leaders managed to take advantage 
of this fortune. Some countries in the region took up to 20 
days between the first COVID-19 confirmed case in the coun-
try and the adoption of strict social isolation measures, while 
others took less than a week to do so. Why is that? What was 
fundamental to a quick government response in adopting the 
kind of measures recommended by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO)? 
In everyday politics, time is already one of the main ob-
stacles faced by the government in policy implementation. Dur-
ing a pandemic, this variable is even more acute. Early action 
was among the most given advice on how to face the virus, 
even before its arrival in Latin America (Cheong, 2020; Pueyol, 
2020; Wei, 2020). The reason is simple and easy to follow: the 
novel coronavirus has the ability to rapidly spread in a sustained 
manner across the population (CDC, 2020), but there is a gap 
between the true number of cases and the officially recorded 
cases. After the first case is confirmed, there is a possibility 
that the virus is already out there in many unaware citizens. 
Rapid action from governments even when there wasn’t a great 
count of cases could reduce the spread of the virus. Although 
the spread of the disease followed a similar path in different 
countries, containment policies had a great impact on slowing 
the disease (Baldwin, Di Mauro, 2020). Pueyol (2020) brings evi-
dence from China that social distance is the best way to reduce 
the number of cases since it does not allow people to interact 
with each other. In South Korea, the president once said that 
there was no reason to restrain daily routines due to the fear 
of the virus, and shortly after came to the large-scaled group 
infections outbreak in a couple of cities in the central part of 
the country (Cheong, 2020). According to a World Bank’s (2020) 
study, contention measures to deal with COVID-19’s spread in 
the population were more effective when earlier applied in 25 
middle-income countries. This evidence is for both strict mea-
sures and loose ones. So, to act rapidly, not mattering how, was 
key to slow down the virus. 
We understand that in some cases leaders lacked the will 
to act, adopting a discourse that reduced the virus mortality 
potential or even embracing negationism. This was the case for 
Nicaragua’s dictator Daniel Ortega, Brazil’s far-right president 
Jair Bolsonaro and Mexico’s leftist president Manuel Lopez Ob-
rador. But mostly, we understand that political institutions oper-
ate an important role in allowing rapid government’s response 
in some countries, while not in others. In an emergency or crisis 
like the coronavirus’ pandemic, the capacity and incentives for 
the government to adopt the necessary measures rest on some 
institutional features like concentration of power, plurality, and 
accountability. 
This is an exploratory work that seeks to identify what 
kind of institutional arrangements are associated with delay in 
Latin American governments’ adoption of strict social isolation 
measures, hence we do not have a testable causal hypothesis4. 
We have a few reasons to focus our effort on Latin America. First, 
we believe this is a region that was lucky in having more time 
and information on how to deal with the virus, and therefore 
we can presume that all considered countries in the analysis had 
the same amount of information to make their choices to act or 
not. Second, when we focus the analysis in one region, we con-
trol for regional specificities, not only at the time of arrival of 
the virus but mainly constitutional similarities (Corrales, 2018). 
When we compare political institutions across Latin America, we 
hope to compare different degrees of similar institutions, most 
of the time. And third, Latin America is a region where you can 
find, according to V-Dem’s Regimes of the Worlds classification, 
liberal democracies (Uruguay and Chile), electoral democracies 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, etc) and electoral autoc-
racies (Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Venezuela), a miscel-
laneous of regimes that add diversity to our comparations. In 
the same way, we have also different kinds of populists dealing 
with the virus in the region, from left to right, from elected in 
free and fair elections to term-limits-expanded-reelection ones. 
If populists are distinguished to be less pragmatic, they can be 
identified as outlier’s performance in a task to compare institu-
tional designs. 
We have a few assumptions to address beforehand. We 
consider that when facing the novel coronavirus’ pandemic, the 
adoption of social isolation measures is the optimal outcome of 
every responsible leader, guided by science and technical ori-
entation. Some leaders waited longer to act in this sense, even 
having the institutional capability to do so since the adoption 
of such measures is unpopular and harmful to the economy. Al-
though some countries had more to lose than others, in terms 
of economy’s size, we should consider that all presidents in this 
analysis had some concern on the side effects of this measures, 
and the variance in the concern, which collaborates in the de-
lay’s variance, should rest upon political institutions’ abilities to 
reward or punish government performance. That said, since they 
roughly prime the same outcome and face the same dilemmas, 
we can compare governments’ delay and address this variance 
to different incentives and containment drawn by political in-
stitutions.   
 To this end, this work is structured as follows. In the first 
section, we go to the literature on government’s response and 
efficiency to natural disasters and political crisis, emergencies 
that most resembles COVID-19 urgency, and on public goods 
provision looking for clues on which institutional designs can 
4 We understand that our work follows Gerring’s (2012) conceptualization of a descriptive work.
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provide more efficient responses. Next, we present the data and 
the analysis we ran to address the relationship between govern-
ments’ delay and some political institutions. In the third and last 
section, we build on the mechanisms that might strengthen and 
illustrate the found correlations.    
Political Institutions during an 
emergency 
In order to assess which institutional designs collaborate 
or embarrass an agile government response, we should go to 
the literature looking for what has been stated for government 
action during emergencies. We understand this by accomplish-
ing that the kind of challenges that governments faced when 
hit by the pandemic was similar to a catastrophe situation, a 
“big, complex and both difficult and different” (Handmer, Do-
vers, 2007, 45).  Lack of time, a high degree of uncertainty, and 
the capacity to act properly are constraints faced by decision-
makers both in corona times (Furman, 2020) and catastrophe 
times (Handmer, Dovers, 2007; Fischhendler et al., 2012), the lit-
erature suggests. But since those decision-makers operate in an 
institutional framework, the handling of the crisis can only be as 
good as the institutional design allows it to be (Boin et al., 2005; 
Handmer, Dovers, 2007; Fischhendler et a, 2012).
An important institutional variable that we must first 
consider is regime type. Democracies and autocracies have dif-
ferent incentives and constraints to deal with crises, given the 
different types of bargaining between leaders and citizens (De-
sai et al., 2009). It is demonstrated elsewhere that concerning 
the time they took to act, autocracies and democracies did not 
differ significantly, for a global sample (Lins et al., 2020). This 
do not mean, thought, that there aren’t different mechanisms 
operating whitin these regime, as Pulejo and Querubin (2020) 
demonstrated that a closer election was associated with milder 
forms of lockdown. Simmilarly, Frey et al. (2020) found that au-
tocracies impose stronger lockdowns since they don’t have to 
worry much with electoral consequences of this policies. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests, however, that in general democracies can 
deal better with crises than autocracies (Rodrik, 1999).
Also, the public policy process differs. In democracies, the 
process is accountable to different constituencies, can be cor-
rected through elections, and goes through several veto players. 
On the other hand, autocracies have an opaque process that 
only responds to the needs of an elite. Those features affect the 
speed of the process: slowing down in democratic countries and 
seeping up in the autocratic ones (Li, 2010; Alon et al., 2020).
Another major determinant for rapid action in abnor-
mal situations is collaborative governance (Berteli et al., 2018). 
A higher coordination level between agencies, authorities from 
different government spheres, and involved actors in general, 
such as private sector and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) can be a great strategy to deal with problems (Ansell, 
Gash et al., 2008). But the stakes are high, and information is 
scarce (Handmer, Dovers, 2007), so to coordinate the efforts 
in a similar way is a particular institutional challenge. As Fis-
chhendler et al. (2012) point, decentralization both increase pri-
vate sector involvement in the emergency response and can en-
hance efficiency, since local authorities are closer to the disaster 
and could enjoy some autonomy to make decisions and take 
actions (Gopalakrishnan, Okada, 2007). However, decentraliza-
tion can also lead to a delay in changing the status quo or even 
preventing such a change (Daehler, 2014).
Although this discussion is legitim, for the COVID-19 
pandemic this was a no dilemma. Centralization and enhance-
ment of the national government were key in most of the coun-
tries (Stephens, 2020; Edgell et al. 2020). This is due to the na-
ture of the problem the virus presents to countries: a widespread 
borderless problem, a whole nation problem, or a whole-society 
problem (Handmer, Dovers, 2007). In this kind of situation, when 
the crisis hit areas that expand through multiple administrative 
jurisdictions, responsibility tends to shift to the major authority 
(Boin et al., 2005). There is an almost consensual understand-
ing in this literature that every catastrophe is unique in a series 
of ways since disasters are abnormal by definition, policy and 
institutional responses will vary considering not only the gov-
ernment regular orientation but also the given challenge that 
the specific tragedy presents to authorities (Boin et al., 2005; 
Handmer, Dovers, 2007; Fischhendler et al., 2012).
Although decentralizing institutions exist to deal with 
territorial and socio-cultural differences (Oates, 1999), coordi-
nation between governments may be necessary to reach a com-
mon goal in some policies (Bakvis, Brown, 2010). Therefore, dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic, coordination between national and 
subnational levels was crucial for efficient response. This places 
the pandemic in a different kind of situation when compared to 
a geographically  located catastrophe that is better managed by 
decentralization, where local authorities or expert agencies lead 
the handling of the crisis (Boin et al., 2005). We can consider 
that an autonomous bureaucratic body that controls its own 
budget has a greater capacity to act (Fischhendler et al.,2012), 
and if this autonomy also means that there is no need to ad-
ditional approval to implement its substantive decisions, this 
autonomous body is more likely to produce responses, as it was 
drawn from the catastrophe literature. However, we should also 
pinpoint that evidence from public goods provisions’ literature 
suggests that decentralization is not linked to government ef-
ficiency (Treisman, 2000, 2002). Therefore, ultimately, federalism 
levels, subnational government’s autonomy, and alignment be-
tween national and local authorities should become investiga-
tion variables for us. 
Also, the discussion presented in the catastrophe litera-
ture between a state or market-centered handling of the crisis 
(Handmer, Dovers, 2007) was completely absent in this pandem-
ic. When facing the novel coronavirus pandemic, governments 
worldwide usually took the measures to asset a wartime situa-
tion in order to properly deal with it. Concentration of power 
and decision making, expansion of budget and expenditures, 
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and bringing the state back in the scene (Stephens, 2020) were 
the consequences of this wartime method. We should investi-
gate, then, in what ways the degree of centralization of deci-
sion-making correlates with the government’s delay. 
The ability to reach a national decision certainly de-
pends on the necessity that a government has to reach a con-
sensus before making a decision. Therefore, levels of democra-
cy and a multiplicity of veto points might be an issue (Tsebelis, 
2002). We have evidence from financial crisis literature that 
veto players and close-by elections are a complicating factor 
for sharp political action (Ha, Kang, 2015), in a way that puts 
pluralism and coordination dilemmas at the core of fast deci-
sion-making variables. 
At the same time, in the universalism and public good 
providing literature, we found that a more institutionalized po-
litical party system can help authorities to overcome veto points 
and coordinate action toward public goods and welfare policies 
(Rasmussen, Knutsen, 2019). The mechanism is that linkages be-
tween society and political parties should make the latter more 
accountable to the former’s demands (Kitschelt, 2000; Samuels, 
Zucco, 2015). Similarly, we also know that the intensity of elec-
toral competition influences social policy reforms since strong 
opposition creates incentives to universalistic and public goods 
provision (Prible, 2013). This way, we should also explore if po-
litical parties’ institutionalization is somehow linked to faster 
decision-making concerning strict social isolation measures. 
In the liberal world, such policies are not only linked to 
public provision willingness of authorities or institutions’ capac-
ity but are subject to deeper concerns in policy-making calcu-
lus. Strict social isolation measures are unpopular and possess a 
harmful side-effect on the economy, as it was highlighted pub-
licly by some presidents5. The situation is indeed complex: politi-
cians should keep the population at their homes, curbing their 
liberties and hurting the economy in order to fight an invisible 
enemy. In an electoral regime, all kinds of arguments should 
populate public opinion trying to take electoral advantage sup-
porting or criticizing the studied-to-be-adopted measures. The 
greater the pluralism, the further away from the consensus. We 
should, finally, examine the relationship between pluralism and 
delay in Latin American governments’ actions to fight the novel 
coronavirus.
Data and analysis 
In this section, we present our delay variable and the in-
stitutional variables we used to run the correlations6.
First, some remarks concerning the creation of our delay 
variable. We identified in Oxford’s database on COVID-19 cases 
and deaths (Roser et al., 2020) the date of the first confirmed 
coronavirus case in each country considered in the database. 
Then, we identified when the government adopted social isola-
tion measures at least at the second level of stringency, accord-
ing to Oxford’s COVID-19 Government Response Tracker data-
base (Hale et al., 2020)7. The difference between those days is 
our delay variable. In Table 1 you can find the summary of this 
variable, both for the world and for Latin American countries.
Now, we wanted to demonstrate that the adoption 
of social isolation measures is a matter of learning. In other 
words, the countries that were hit first took longer to adopt 
such policies because they did not know exactly what to do. 
After a few weeks and months, social isolation started to be 
higlighted as the best way to avoid contamination and spread 
of the virus. That way, the countries where COVID-19 arrived 
later could adopt these measures in less time. Considering 
this, we can divide the world sample by when COVID-19 ar-
rived at the countries. We created a categorical variable wave 
after the identification of for how long since the countries 
have had the first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus. 
Those who had confirmed cases first are in the wave “1” cat-
egory, first wave countries; and those who had confirmed 
Sample Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. N
World 0 12.25 25 40.04 56.00 154.00 162
Latin America 0 6.50 15.50 18.19 21.25 69 16
Table 1: Summary of the delay variable
Source: Authors.
5 “Coronavirus: Brazil’s Bolsonaro in denial and out on a limb”. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52080830. Visited 
in July 25, 2020.
“Coronavirus: “El gobierno de Nicaragua está tratando de esconder los muertos”. Retrieved from: 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52716064. Visited July 25, 2020.
6 The complete replication material of this work can be found at: https://osf.io/53cwy/?view_only=5c24251d91c5413a806975f5701373e8
7 It is important to point that we followed the databases’ dates as a reference for the first confirmed case in every country (Roser et al., 2020) and 
also for the adoption of social isolation measures.
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cases later on are in wave “2” and “3”, second and third waves 
countries. Figure 18 shows the distribution of the variable 
that counts how many days since the first confirmed case9, 
and the red lines indicates the waves categories. 
With the countries divided into waves, we can plot the 
difference of the means of the delay between each group (Fig-
ure 2), considering only countries that at some point in time 
adopted what we are considering here as strict social isolation 
measure (dropping the cases that simply did not act). It is evi-
dent now that countries who were hit by the pandemic later 
knew what to do and were faster in adopting strict social isola-
tion measures. We ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for these 
variables and the results show that these differences in means 
are statistically significant, as we can see in Table 2. 
Now we can focus on Latin American countries, consid-
ering that they all belong to the second wave group who knew 
better what they should do to avoid the COVID-19 spread (com-
pared to wave 1 countries, at least).  Figure 3 presents the delay 
for each Latin American country considered - Nicaragua is not in 
the Figure since it did not adopt such measures.
The first variable to be addressed here is the regime type, 
using V-Dem’s Regimes of the World measure, a categorical vari-
able that considers that a regime can be a closed autocracy (0), 
an electoral autocracy (1), an electoral democracy (2), or a liberal 
democracy (3). In our 16 Latin American countries sample, we 
have two liberal democracies, eleven electoral democracies, and 
three electoral autocracies. As the boxplot presented in Figure 
4 suggest the electoral autocracies (Venezuela, Honduras and 
Sum Sq Df F value Pr(> F)
(Intercept) 26,234.980 1 149.970 0
wave 12,779.900 1 73.055 0
Residuals 19,417.780 111
Table 2: ANOVA between delay and wave
Source: Authors.
8 This graph is the histogram for the distribution of the “start” variable, which indicates how many days the country is living with confirmed cases 
of COVID-19. At the same time, this variable allows us to identify the day when the first case was confirmed in a particular country. Countries with 
similar values of “start” had the first confirmed case of the disease on the same day. On the x-axis in Figure 1 are all the 136 days we consider, and 
at the y-axis the number of countries with the first COVID-19 case confirmed on each day. This way, each bar in the graph presents the number of 
countries with the first case confirmed on that particular day. And this is why we can divide the x-axis into three waves.
9 Our threshold is June 30. Countries who confirmed COVID-19 cases after this date are not in the sample.
Figure 1: Distribution of how many days since the first confirmed 
case and waves (red lines)
Source: Authors
Figure 2: Boxplot of the difference in the average delay for the 
different waves
Source: Author
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Bolivia) were faster in adopting strict social isolation measures 
when compared to the liberal democracies (Chile and Uruguay).
From now on, we followed Osborne and Overbay (2004) 
demonstrations and suggestion to transform outliers of the delay 
variable in the sample for a more honest estimate of population 
parameters. We transformed the outliers values by the mean, 
18,19 days, (see also Barnett and Lewis, 1994), what means we 
transformed two delay values, Brazil’s 69 days and Dominan Re-
public’s 47 days, when estimating for the coorelations below.
So, when plotting the correlation between delay and 
polyarchy, we found another suggestion that democracy, plu-
ralism, and diversity in the society might be linked to delay in 
the governments’ response. We used V-Dem’s polyarchy index 
and found a statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) 0.656 posi-
tive correlation with delay (Figure 510), and that for social science 
could be considered as “strong” (Cohen, 1988). Two might be the 
reasons for this relation. A democracy, per definition, has a higher 
amount of veto players and institutional constrains that permeate 
the struggle to adopt and implement any policy. It is costlier to 
adopt policies in terms of coordination. We should also consider 
the dilemmas that elected politicians confronted when deciding 
whether to adopt or not social isolation. Of course, it is easier 
to implement a social movement restriction policy in a country 
where freedom is not institutionally imbricated. Another thing is 
to suggest such a measure, that will profoundly hurt the economy, 
in an electoral regime, where the president and governors might 
be punished by the popular vote for such consequences. There is, 
then, also a moral cost implicating in delay. 
To check if concentration of power gives another per-
spective to the democracy and delay relation, we run a correla-
tion between delay and V-Dem’s presidentialism index, which ul-
timately measures concentration of political power in the hands 
of one individual (Figure 6). In Latin America, presidentialism is 
a constant, so it is a privileged region to access this association. 
We found a negative correlation of -0.579, statistically signifi-
cant (p-value < 0.01). So, we are primed to consider that more 
veto players, more deliberation and more horizontal account-
ability might have delayed governments’ adoption of the most 
recommended measures to fight COVID-19. We also run correla-
tions between delay and division of power index (division be-
tween central and subnational governments) from V-Dem’s data 
set and a variable for party alignment between the national and 
the subnational governments, collected by ourselves11. These re-
sults were not statistically significant nor strong, but their signal 
Figure 3: Dot plot for the delay variable in the Latin America 
sample
Source: Authors.
Figure 4: Difference in means of regimes’ delay
Source: Authors.
10 When looking at the Figures 5, 6 and 7, please note that Brazil’s and Dominican Republic’s delay score correspond to the adjusted value (18,19), 
not the real delay of these countries, since we used these adjusted values for the correlations tests.
11 Alignment between sub-national (state or provinces) governments and the national government in the beginning of 2020. This variable was 
measured as a ratio of how many subnational governments are aligned with the president out of the total number of subnational entities. By 
alignment we understood governor’s partisanship to parties from the national ruling coalition. For those countries without elected state or province 
governors, the regional administrator is appointed by the president and therefore this variable score 1.0 in such cases. In the replication material of 
this work you can find the values for this and all other variables considered here in our data set – with the sources we consulted for construction 
of variables such as alignment and majority.
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was as expected, positive (0.25) for the federalism index (more 
federalism correlates with more delay since federalism means 
another sphere of action that is prone to coordination problems) 
and negative (-0.29) for alignment (more alignment correlates 
with less delay since the coordination problem between this 
spheres is somehow diminished).  
At this point, we tested the correlation between delay 
and GDP per capita, trying to assess how the economy was con-
sidered as a determinant in the strategic calculus operated by 
the goverments when deciding to act or not. This might oper-
ate in two possible ways: as a moral dilemma, if one considers 
that the size of the economy and the richness of a population 
were correlated with more delay, suggesting that those dilem-
mas were higher when the stakes were higher; or as an electoral 
concern, signifying that the leader himself had more to loose 
if social isolation was adopted and the economy was damaged. 
We found a positive, statistically significant (p < 0.01), and 
strong correlation of 0.663 (Figure 7). It seems that the richer 
the country, the higher the delay. 
We ultimately checked if political parties’ institutionaliza-
tion correlates with our delay variable. We used V-Dem’s party 
institutionalization index, wich measures several institucionaliza-
tion components such as level of organization, links with the so-
ciety, supporters within the electorate and legislative discipline. As 
more institutionalized political parties demonstrate a higher level 
of commitments to society (Rasmussen, Knutsen, 2019), an insti-
tutionalized party system should offer a greater level of authorities’ 
responsiveness to a pandemic. The result was weak and not statisti-
cally significant, but the signal was positive (0.41). 
As we all know the mantra, correlation it is not causa-
tion. If we want to stand our suggestions in a steadier ground, 
we should employ other methods to address causation. With 
a small/medium sample, this is not an easy task. In the next 
section, we dive into some countries of our sample looking 
for examples of those statistical correlations in the national 
experiences. We still won’t be able to address causation, but 
we hope to nourish the previous exposed correlations and 
strength these suggestions. 
Figure 5: Polyarchy and delay
Source: Authors.
Figure 6: Presidentialism and delay
Source: Authors.
Figure 7: GDP per capita and delay
Source: Authors.
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Cases
In this session, we will proceed with the case studies in 
three groups: democracy and its correlation with delay, autoc-
racy and its correlation with quick response, and populism and 
denial. We selected Latin America’s most emblematic cases of 
each group to provide a cross-national approach. 
Chile, Uruguay, and Dominican 
Republic
From what we got from the data a high polyarchy index 
seems to be positively correlated with delay in government action 
for social isolation. We suggested that this might be the case as a 
democracy features more constraints to action, more veto players 
in the decision-making process, requirement of coordination within 
the governing coalition (sometimes even with the opposition), and 
politicians subject to electoral accountability. These elements might 
collaborate with the delay to adopt social isolation measures, a 
policy that it is not easy to make considering the economics’ costs 
attached to it. In Latin America, Chile and Uruguay are the region’s 
only two liberal democracies, scoring in the polyarchy index, 0.773 
and 0.858, respectively. Chile took 20 days after the first case was 
confirmed to adopt a strict social isolation policy, while Uruguay 
took 18. The mean for the region is 18.19 days.
The beginning of 2020 brought mixed feelings to Chilean 
democracy. The country experienced massive social protests in 
the last months of 2019 that resulted in a scheduled referendum 
on the necessity to implement a new constitution, expected to 
happen in April. The highly contested and unpopular president, 
Sebastian Piñera, together with the Congress and the Supreme 
Court, are leading the Constitutional Convention that postponed 
the referendum to October. Chilean political establishment and 
institutions are severely hurt after last year’s protests, with a 2% 
trust in the political parties and a 3% trust in the Congress, a 
public opinion survey revealed12. In this scenario, with the pan-
demic arrival, Piñera had to lead a nation that did not recognize 
him as a leader anymore. Only 12% of the population approved 
his administration at the end of February13.
The first confirmed case in Chile was on March 4th, while 
the social isolation measure was only implemented on March 
25th following a State of Constitutional Exception decreed by 
the government on March 18th. This kind of reaction was com-
mon across democracies from all over the world. Great powers 
are therefore requested to deal with great and urgent challeng-
es, indicating that democracies usually do not provide leaders 
with the appropriate tools to act effectively in such situations. 
Piñera’s capacity to act was priorly condemned not only by 
popular antipathy but also to institutional constraints such as 
being a minority leader in the Congress. Any policy proposed in 
mid-March would have to be discussed in the prism of the cal-
culus that balances social isolation and economic consequences. 
The minister of health, Jaime Mañalice, was one of the govern-
ment’s voice that publicly disclaimed the “many adverse effects” 
of social isolation14. Since we also found a positive correlation 
between delay and economy’s size, it is appropriate to address 
that Chile is the first Latin American country in terms of GDP per 
capita. We should, therefore, conclude that the virus got Chilean 
government thinking if it worth the shot, to stop the country 
and somehow cool down protests that were once again striking 
against the state at the cost of the economy. Eventually, they 
acted. Better later than never. 
Two weeks after president Lacalle Pou took office in Uru-
guay, the country had its first coronavirus case confirmed, on 
March 15th. The left coalition Frente Amplio ruled the country 
for 15 years and Pou was elected under an economic and se-
curity platform. This shift of power between opposite sides was 
celebrated as being as democratic as it could be. Such transition, 
however, was not the most efficient. Fifteen days in office and 
the president had not yet appointed all his staff when he had 
to deal with the pandemic. Reports on the transition process 
describe some difficulties within the elected coalition concern-
ing negotiations for positions, unfamiliarity with ministerial 
structure, and delay in some designation process that needed 
Senate approval15. Such negotiations and bureaucratic processes 
for nominations are attributes from democratic institutions that 
you cannot found in more authoritarian regimes. It is democ-
racy’s way to discuss as it is democracy’s way to put positions 
under horizontal accountability.
In Uruguay, 14% of the population is over 65 years old16. 
An aged society like this was particularly worried about COV-
ID-19 consequences, considering that elderly people are in the 
12 “Desafios del processo constituyente chileno”. Retrieved from: https://www.celag.org/desafios-del-proceso-constituyente-chileno/.  Visited in July 
1st, 2020
13 “Aprobacion de Piñera briones”. Retrieved from: https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/cadem-febrero-2020-aprobacion-pinera-briones_20200224/. 
Visited in July 1st, 2020
14 “ El ministro de salud de Chile rechaza la cuarentena por el coronavírus, ‘el destino és que toda la población mundial se infecte, a menos que exista 
uma vacuna’.” Retrieved from: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2020/04/15/el-ministro-de-salud-de-chile-rechaza-la-cuarentena-
por-el-coronavirus-el-destino-es-que-toda-la-poblacion-mundial-se-infecte-a-menos-que-exista-una-vacuna/. Visited in July 1st, 2020
15 “Entre el ajuste y el vírus: primer més de Lacalle”. Retrieved from: https://www.celag.org/entre-el-ajuste-y-el-virus-primer-mes-de-lacalle/. Visited 
in July 1st, 2020
16 “Sociedade envejedica busca hacerle frente a pandemia”. Retrieved from: https://www.clarin.com/mundo/coronavirus-uruguay-sociedad-envejecida-
busca-hacerle-frente-pandemia_0_HL7uFmUjN.html. Visited in July 1st, 2020
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risk group of the disease. Uruguay’s doctor’s Union suggested 
a total quarantine of the population on March 17th17. Besides 
that, the first official policies did not consider strict stay at home 
requirements. Schools were suspended, agglomeration was pro-
hibited, and those who could were designated to telework. The 
government took those measures in the first days of the out-
break in the country, most of the time coordinated with the 
opposition18. Strict social isolation was only adopted on April 2nd, 
still not as strict as other countries. The great debate during the 
delay in adopting these policies was whether it would be a total 
and mandatory or partial and volunteered quarantine, consider-
ing the economic costs. These two visions were defended, each 
of them, by government and opposition19, with the government 
much more reluctant to adopt strict isolation. We cannot say the 
government was paralyzed until the adoption of such a policy, 
this is not our suggestion. What it seems to us is that consider-
ation and coordination, two elements more likely to be found 
in democracies than autocracies, takes time. Uruguayan case il-
lustrates that even with opposite political forces agreeing in the 
macro policies, a lot still has to be discussed before a complex 
measure is adopted.   
Although it is not a role model of Latin American democ-
racy, Dominican Republic experience has to be shortly addressed 
here (polyarchy index, 0.598). It took 47 days to the govern-
ment to adopt a strict social isolation measure after the first 
confirmed case of COVID-19 in the country. The president had 
the majority in the Legislative (his party has 76% of the seats in 
the Senate20) and the sub-national governments are not elected 
but appointed by the Executive. One could say that he was a 
strong president with institutional support to act. Why did he 
take so long? 
Probably because 2020 is an electoral year in Dominican 
Republic, with presidential elections initially scheduled for May 
15 and postponed to July 521. Landman and Splendore (2020) list 
several possibilities for the pandemic to make elections unfea-
sible and, therefore, to be a risk to democratic rule itself, includ-
ing low turnout, term’s expansion, and compromised steps in the 
electoral cycle, as voter’s registration processes and campaigns. 
But a close-by election also affects the government’s behavior, 
particularly those concerning economic performance (Drazen, 
2000). Since voters end up evaluating the government only by 
the last year of economic performance, as a cognitive short-
cut (Healy, Lenz, 2013), it becomes urgent to the incumbent to 
deliver a safe economic policy considering his prospects to the 
election. Pulejo and Querubin (2020) already found some evi-
dence that incumbents who have a coming election implement 
less strict policies dealing with the pandemic. In these cases, 
we have to considerer that the dilemma between isolation and 
economy comes with different weights with a close-by election. 
The president does not want to be punished in the ballot by 
the economic downturns caused by the quarantines or curfews. 
In the Dominican Republic case, the government first adopted 
flawless isolation measures, not paralyzing industrial and agri-
cultural sectors for example22. Electoral accountability empha-
sized the dilemma that governments faced, therefore consisting 
of another democratic attribute that collaborated with delay to 
adopt isolation measures.        
Venezuela and El Salvador 
On the other face of the coin, Venezuela, the lowest 
polyarchy index of the region, 0.229, was the only country to 
be ahead of the disease, in the sense that it adopted strict social 
isolation measures two days before the first confirmed case of 
COVID-19 in the country. Nicolás Maduro, the Bolivarian presi-
dent, announced on March 13 a State of Alert, increasing his 
powers even more than regular, since Venezuela has already the 
second most powerful president in the region, according to the 
presidentialism index, only slightly behind Nicaragua’s dicta-
tor Daniel Ortega – Venezuela has a 0.963 index and Nicaragua 
0.976. We found a somehow moderated and negative correla-
tion between this index and delay. According to V-Dem’s code-
book, this index measures the extent to which the president is 
free from constraints by other political actors and institutions. 
In practice, it means that the more power the president concen-
trates, the easier it is to implement the complex and debatable 
social isolation policies. 
It is not novelty the autocratization process Venezuela 
has been experiencing since the first decade of the century, and 
this process includes systematic harassment of the opposition 
(Corrales, 2020). With a president as powerful as Maduro and 
an opposition as weak as the Venezuelan, one can adopt the 
policies one thinks it is legitimate. That being the case, and also 
considering that Venezuela’s infrastructure had the potential to 
17 “El Sindicato médico del Uruguay exhorta a implementar cinco medidas sanitárias”. Retrieved from: https://www.smu.org.uy/el-sindicato-medico-
del-uruguay-exhorta-a-implementar-cinco-medidas-sanitarias/. Visited in July 1st, 2020
18 “Fondo coronavírus aprobado por Senadores”. Retrieved from: https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/vivo-diputados-debate-fondo-
coronavirus-aprobado-senadores.html. Visited in July 1st, 2020
19 “Una remake de viejas recetas”. Retrieved from: https://brecha.com.uy/una-remake-de-viejas-recetas/. Visited in July 1st, 2020
20 “60% de los legisladores dominicanos fue reelecto”. Retrieved from: https://acento.com.do/politica/60-los-legisladores-dominicanos-fue-reelecto-
elecciones-2016-8377142.html. Visited in June 28, 2020.
21 Election Guide. Forthcoming. Retrieved from: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3284/. Visited in June 28, 2020.
22 Presidencia de Republica Dominicana. Acciones del gobierno para el enfrentamento del COVID-19. Retrieved from: https://presidencia.gob.do/
infografia/acciones-del-gobierno-covid-19. Visited in June 28, 2020.
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create a world calamity when hit by the pandemic23, in terms of 
hospitals and sanitation, Maduro could and acted fast, no insti-
tutional strings attached. 
As an electoral autocracy, Venezuela might have an 
institutional facede that resembles a liberal democracy, but 
its institutions have been deturped in favor of the ruling 
elite (Corrales, 2020). In this scenario institutions of repre-
sentation are just another kind of domination’s institutions. 
Subnational governors, for example, can serve to delegate 
power to agents aligned with the government than to ef-
fectively share power (Schedler, 2013). In 2020, 19 of the 23 
state governors in Venezuela were aligned to Maduro. This 
is a context were unconformity is unlikely. Thus, Frey et al. 
(2020) demonstrated that autocratic regimes impose more 
stringent lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, indi-
cating that autocracies overcome democracies’ institutional 
barriers and dilemmas, while not necessarily resulting in ef-
ficient achievement of policies objectives.    
El Salvador did not start the year 2020 considered as an 
autocracy. In fact, it is considered an electoral democracy, with a 
0.631 polyarchy index and 0.298 presidentialism index, both for 
the year 2019. Less than a year in power, though, Nayib Bukele 
started an executive aggrandizement in 2020, invading the Con-
gress accompanied by the military in February24 and repeatedly 
defying the Supreme Court25. Bermeo (2016) appoints that to 
weaken constraints on the executive power and to strategically 
harass and manipulate opposition are the most common tools to 
erode democratic regimes in this century. Coppedge (2019) simi-
larly suggests that the power that an autocratic executive en-
hance comes at the expense of courts and legislatures. On March 
19, El Salvador had the first confirmed cases of COVID-19. On 
March 21, Bukele announced a State of Emergency enhancing 
his powers and adopting strict social isolation measures. What 
follows suggests that Bukele did not have the most democratic 
of the intentions.
The military was on the streets and containment cen-
ters were installed to arrest those accused of gathering and 
disrespect the curfew. These centers were accused to violate 
human rights, without basic hygiene conditions nor adequate 
care considering the pandemic. When the Supreme Court 
ordered the release of those prisoners without coronavirus 
symptoms, Bukele did not obey and claimed to be “the man 
in charge” after the opposition suggested that the pandemic 
measures should be widely discussed26. Bukele is an example 
of an autocrat that took advantage of the pandemic to erode 
democratic institutions. During a state of emergency, those 
institutions can be eroded while keeping constitutional le-
gitimacy, the favorite strategy of the 21st century autocrat. 
In fact, democracies are 75% more prone to erode while in a 
declared state of emergency (Luhrman, Rooney, 2020). Dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic, while the social isolation mea-
sures were the most recommended and suggested measures 
to avoid the spread of the virus, as it was highlight earlier, 
these policies could be used to violate fundamental rights 
and to severely hurt democracy (Edgell et. al, 2020). From 
the evidence discussed here, we have reasons to believe that 
this is the case for Bukele, an autocrat in the making. With 
enhanced powers and malice, he acted fast, in part because 
he could, in part because he needed and wanted to.
Negationists (Brazil, Mexico and 
Nicaragua)
Three Latin American leaders have been notorious deniers 
of the gravity imposed by the novel coronavirus. Presidents of 
Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua tried to soften the impact that CO-
VID-19 could have in the public health system and, ultimately, in 
the diseases’ death toll. Perhaps the best illustration of this rea-
soning is the classification made by Jair Bolsonaro, president of 
23 “Venezuela necessita una tregua política para lidiar con el coronavírus”. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2020/03/23/espanol/opinion/
venezuela-maduro-guaido-coronavirus.html. Visited in June 28, 2020.
24 “Presidente de El Salvador invade o Congresso com militares amparado por direito divino”. Retrieved from: https://brasil.elpais.com/
internacional/2020-02-10/presidente-de-el-salvador-invade-o-congresso-com-militares-amparado-por-direito-divino.html. Visited in June 28, 2020.
25 “El Salvador presidente defies supreme court”. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/17/el-salvador-president-defies-supreme-court. 
Visited in June 28, 2020.
26 “Presidente de El Savador usa quarentana para radicalizar autoritarismo”. Retrieved from: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2020/04/
presidente-de-el-salvador-usa-quarentena-para-radicalizar-autoritarismo-no-pais.shtml. Visited in June 28, 2020.
Figure 8: Populism score (1998-2019)
Source: Authors, with data from Global Populism Dataset.
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Brazil when he stated that the COVID-19 was only a gripezinha 
(“minor flu”)27. The three countries also have one more feature 
in common: their presidents’ scores are high in a populist index. 
Figure 8 shows the values for all presidencies of the three coun-
tries, from 1998 to 2019:
The data comes from the Global Populism Dataset, cre-
ated by Hawkins and coauthors (2019). This dataset codes each 
president based on textual analysis (speeches, manifestos, politi-
cal documents, etc.) and takes an ideational approach of popu-
lism. This means that every populist discourse will have “at least 
a discourse in which the putative will of the common people is 
in conflict with a conspiring elite” (HAWKINS et al, 2019, p. 2). 
In other words: Political leaders are positioned in a populist scale 
based on how much they stress the conflict between the com-
mon people  and a corrupt elite.
While there is no necessarily link between populism and 
negationism, all cases of populist leaders in Latin America flirted – 
at least temporarily – with the negation of the pandemics’ gravid-
ity. But the the populist’s behavior can be constrained or echoed 
depending on the political institutions in place. In countries where 
the concentration of power by the president is higher, the impact 
of negationism might  be also stronger. On the other hand, where 
party institutionalization is strong and political power is shared 
with subnational entities, populists should be easily constrained.
The values from the Global Poulism Dataset range from 0 
to 2, with the following cut-points: below 0.5, the leader is not 
populist; from 0.5 to 0.9, the politician is somewhat populist; 
from 1 to 1.49, the leader is populist; and above 1.5 it is con-
sidered very populist. As we can see from the figure, Bolsonaro 
is the only president from Brazil to be considered at least some-
what populist. The same can be said about Mexico’s Obrador. 
And all three presidencies of Ortega are among the top-five, 
with his first presidency (2007-2012) the most populist for the 
three countries for the period28.
 Not surprisingly, the three countries are among those 
that waited the most to take action against COVID-19. Brazil is 
the country with the highest delay in the region: 69 days. Mexico 
is the fourth, with a delay of 29 days. Both are well over the mean 
for Latin America (18.19 days). But the most worrisome case is 
that of Nicaragua: until the consolidation of the dataset used in 
this work, the country had not taken a strict isolation policy. And 
according to a press release from early June, the president said 
that the country never will adopt such measures29. The link be-
tween populist leader and weak response has already been shown 
by Kavakli (2020). The main argument has two features. First, 
populists usually distrust elites, and scientists are no exception. 
Policy suggestions made by the scientific community fall in deaf 
ears. The second feature is what the author calls “economic con-
servatism”. Populist leaders tend to balance the economic effects 
of the policy being implemented and underreact in the early days 
of the pandemic. However, once the diseases become more appar-
ent, they may overcompensate (Kavakli, 2020).
All three leaders have, at some point, made use of dilem-
mas opposing the reaction to the novel coronavirus and the state 
of the economy or even civil liberties. In the case of Brazil, Bol-
sonaro made use of both. The Brazilian federalist arrangement 
tries to associate level of coordination and autonomy, which 
historically varies between states and specific policies (Arretche, 
2004). During the novel coronavirus pandemic, governors and 
mayors had autonomy to lead efforts in fighting the disease. 
But this dynamic took on a new chapter: the conflict between 
subnational governments and national executive. Despite the 
1988 Federal Constitution’s tradition of cooperation, Bolsonaro 
ended up implementing a very centralized kind of federalism: (i) 
reinforcing the division of powers, at the same time as decreas-
ing federal funding and transfers for inequality reduction; (ii) 
concentrating decisions that affect subnational units; and (iii) 
creating a constant struggle with governors and mayors, stirring 
his constituency against local executive governments. (Abrucio 
et al, 2020). 
An explicit example of this conflict goes back to the 
when governors enacted lockdowns. Bolsonaro argued that they 
were limiting the right to come and go of citizens30. This was 
specially the case when the governors were political opponents 
of the president, such as the cases of Sao Paulo and Rio de Ja-
neiro governors, Joao Doria and Wilson Witzel, respectively. The 
conflict reached the last judicial instance, when the Supreme 
Federal Court (STF) had to decide on competences regarding the 
definitions of the rule of social distancing policies31. Despite his-
torically deciding in favor of the Union, the STF decided that 
27 “Bolsonaro: ‘Depois da facada, não vai ser uma gripezinha que vai me derrubar’”. Retrieved from: https://valor.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/20/
bolsonaro-depois-da-facada-no-vai-ser-uma-gripezinha-que-vai-me-derrubar.ghtml. Visited in June 28, 2020.
28 Among sitting presidents, only one have a score higher than Bolsonaro, Obrador, and Ortega: Maduro, from Venezuela. Some presidents are not 
yet in the dataset because their term began only recently. This is the case of Nayib Bukele from El Salvador.
29 “Nicarágua: casos de COVID-19 aumentam e há denúncia de subnotificação”. Retrieved from: https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/
noticia/2020-06/nicaragua-casos-de-covid-19-aumentam-e-ha-denuncias-de-subnotificacao. Visited in June 28, 2020.
30 “Bolsonaro critica governadores e diz que desrespeito a decreto de atividades essenciais aflora autoritarismo”. Retrieved from: https://www1.folha.
uol.com.br/cotidiano/2020/05/bolsonaro-critica-governadores-e-diz-que-desrespeito-a-decreto-de-atividades-essenciais-aflora-autoritarismo.
shtml. Visited in June 28, 2020.
31 “Supremo decide que estados e municípios têm poder para definir regras sobre isolamento”. Retrieved from: https://g1.globo.com/politica/
noticia/2020/04/15/maioria-do-supremo-vota-a-favor-de-que-estados-e-municipios-editem-normas-sobre-isolamento.ghtml. Visited in September 
22nd, 2020.
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the federal and subnational governments have competing com-
petence in health issues and on actions against the Covid-19 
pandemic (Abrucio et al, 2020).  
Bolsonaro also stated that “the cure cannot be worse 
than the disease itself”32. The argument is that keeping people at 
home would kill poorer people that usually work in the informal 
sector and do not have job security. Also, the slowdown of the 
economy would generate mass unemployment, thus creating a 
big problem to be solved post-pandemics. This was also the ar-
gument made by Obrador when reopening the economy on June 
2nd. He stated that it was necessary to “normalize productive, 
economic, social, and cultural activities”33.
Another point in common for the three deniers of the 
region is the strong attack on the media. Common adjectives are 
“alarmist” and “irresponsible”. When in a press conference in ear-
ly June, Obrador was asked about the record-breaking number 
of 1,092 registered deaths in the previous 24 hours. In response, 
the Mexican president lashed out at the media, arguing that the 
numbers did not mean that 1,092 persons died, but only that 
their deaths were registered in that interval34. A similar approach 
was made by Bolsonaro. In the Brazilian case, however, the gov-
ernment officially tried to change the way figures related to 
the pandemic were publicized. From June 5th to June 9th, the 
government only released the number of confirmed deaths. The 
Supreme Court needed to give an order for the government to 
resume the release of numbers related to registered deaths35.
 So far, we have seen that all three presidents had simi-
lar behavior – at least in the early days of the pandemic. And 
although ideologically very distant, Bolsonaro and Obrador have 
some similarities. Their presidencies began only one day apart 
(December 31st 2018 for Obrador; January 1st 2019 for Bolso-
naro). That means that during the pandemic both of them were 
far from facing voters in the ballot box for reelection36. Both of 
them also adopted the strategy of minimizing the novel corona-
virus. But their divergences are also relevant. Soon after shoot-
ing a video having breakfast in a restaurant to prove that the 
danger was minimal37, Obrador recognized the problem.
The institutional barriers they face are also different. 
While Obrador was elected with an overwhelming majority in 
the legislature, Bolsonaro is what can be called a minority presi-
dent. In the 2018 election, his support group could not win the 
majority of seats. But it gets even worse: Bolsonaro had a strong 
fallout with the president of his party and abandoned it. Now, 
he is trying to create his own political association38.
Politically speaking, Nicaragua is a different kind of ani-
mal. It can be classified straightforwardly as an authoritarian 
country, or electoral autocracy according to the Regimes of the 
World classification. If not de jure, at least de facto. To under-
stand the personality of the Nicaraguan president, he went miss-
ing for 34 days at the beginning of the pandemic outbreak39. The 
country not only did not adopt strict measures of social distanc-
ing but is also accused of hiding the real figures. According to 
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the country is 
not informing the number of tests conducted.
Daniel Ortega is in his third consecutive term as presi-
dent, fourth in total. He is governing with the assistance of his 
wife, Rosario Murillo, elected as his vice-president. Since 2018 
the country is facing a political crisis, with 326 citizens killed 
in conflicts40. This standoff between government and opposi-
tion began in April 2018, when Ortega proposed a reform in 
the country’s pension system. The opposition took the streets 
to protest and was firmly restrained by the police. This led the 
opposition to call for resignation of the president. Since them, 
negotiations started but it did not have success41.
We believe that a note on these three presidents’ popu-
larity is also relevant. In the case of Bolsonaro, the gap between 
32 “Bolsonaro diz que é preciso brigar para que desemprego não seja efeito colateral da crise”. Retrieved from: https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/
bolsonaro-diz-que-preciso-brigar-para-que-desemprego-nao-seja-efeito-colateral-da-crise-24323656. Visited in June 28, 2020.
33 “México inicia reabertura econômica e supera 10.000 mortos por COVID-19”. Retrieved from: https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/
afp/2020/06/01/mexico-inicia-reabertura-economica-e-supera-10000-mortos-por-covid-19.htm. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
34 “Obrador defende estratégia do México contra a covid após recorde de mortes”. Retrieved from: https://valor.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2020/06/04/
obrador-defende-estrategia-do-mexico-contra-a-covid-apos-recorde-de-mortes.ghtml. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
35 “Ministério da saúde volta a divulgar no site oficial dados acumulados da COVID-19”. Retrieved from: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/06/09/
ministerio-da-saude-volta-a-divulgar-no-site-oficial-dados-acumulados-da-covid-19.ghtml. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
36 The presidency in Mexico have a six-years fixed term. Brazil have a four-years fixed term. In Nicaragua, the elections guarantee a five-years term.
37 “Presidente Lopez Obrador dice mexicanos que sigan.”. Retrieved from:  https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2020/03/23/nota/7793205/coronavirus-
presidente-lopez-obrador-dice-mexicanos-que-sigan. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
38 “Bolsonaro lança fundação do partido Aliança pelo Brasil”. Retrieved from:  https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/11/21/bolsonaro-lanca-
fundacao-do-partido-alianca-pelo-brasil.ghtml. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
39 “Daniel Ortega reaparece tras 34 dias y vuelve a minimizar el impacto de la pandemia en Nicaragua”. Retrieved from: https://elpais.com/
sociedad/2020-04-16/daniel-ortega-reaparece-tras-34-dias-y-vuelve-a-minimizar-el-impacto-de-la-pandemia-en-nicaragua.html. Visited in July 
1st, 2020.
40 “Daniel Ortega descarta dialogo com oposição e propõe eleições para 2021”. Retrieved from: https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/
geral,daniel-ortega-descarta-dialogo-com-oposicao-e-propoe-eleicoes-para-2021,70002929672. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
41 “Nicaraguan opposition walks, talks Ortega government”. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/nicaraguan-opposition-walks-
talks-ortega-government-190311142024776.html. Visited in July 1st, 2020.
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those who disapprove and approve the president first widened 
in the early months of the pandemic. In April, 38% of respon-
dents in a national survey disapproved the president; this num-
ber went up to 44% by June. The number for those who approve 
his presidency is stable: went from 33% to 32%42. However, this 
figures started to change from June onwards. According to a 
Datafolha poll conducted in mid-September, those who approve 
the government had a five percentage point increase, reaching 
37%. An even greater change was seen in the disapproval rate: 
a ten percentage point decrease, going from 44% to 34%. The 
poll suggests a correlation between those changes and the dis-
tribution of a R$ 600 emergency aid. From those who collected 
the emergency aid, 42% approves the government of Bolsonaro. 
Among those who were not recipients of the emergency aid, 
this figure is 36%43. The value of such aid will be cut in half for 
the last for months of its vigency, starting in September. This 
could lead to a new shift in the sentiments of Brazilians toward 
president Bolsonaro.
The downfall of Obrador is still more sensitive. Two years 
ago, when he got elected president of Mexico, he had an ap-
proval rate of 77%. In April 2020, his approval was 68%. The 
latest poll shows approval of 56%44. Still a well-rated president, 
but it seems that COVID-19 is melting his numbers. In Nicaragua, 
there is a constant fear of reprisal. This could skew the poll. But 
the results showed that Ortega has the support of only 24% of 
the population45.
Conclusion
In this paper, we were concerned about exploring pos-
sible political institutions constraints to the Latin American gov-
ernments’ adoption of strict social isolation measures during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. We brought from the catastrophe, political 
crisis, and public goods provision literature some variables that 
are usually addressed for government efficiency discussions. 
Limited by our small sample, we used descriptive statistics to 
investigate which institutions were correlated with delay, and 
then we dived in some countries’ experiences to further analyze 
the found relationships.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: (i) for the 
world sample, countries who experienced the novel coronavirus 
later had more information on how to deal with the pandemic 
and therefore took less time to adopt strict social isolation mea-
sures; (ii) democracies present some institutional constrains to 
presidential action that might have influenced governments’ 
delay, including horizontal and electoral accountability; (iii) au-
tocrats generally can act more freely, without checks and bal-
ances to their actions or worries with electoral costs, and there-
fore could adopt the complex social isolation measures more 
rapidly; (iv) the size of the economy can illustrate what was on 
stake during government’s policy study and considerations; (v) 
populists clearly took their time before taking action. Following 
their anti-science rhetoric, populist leaders were less willing to 
sacrifice the economy to combat COVID-19.
One cannot abstract from this paper the idea that de-
mocracies are the worst regimes that misconducted the pan-
demic policies. Democracies, during pandemics or not, are still 
the regimes that consider civil liberties the most. So, demo-
cratic leaders think too much, reflect too much, consider too 
much. This is not necessarily a problem. Politics is complex and 
urge responsibilities. 
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